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The impact of local commissioning on victim services in England and Wales: 
an empirical study. 
This paper follows on from earlier work in which I discussed the potential impacts of 
local commissioning of victim services by Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) in 
England and Wales (Simmonds 2016).  The introduction of this elected role and the 
devolution of responsibility to local Police and Crime Commissioners was said to 
raise a range of issues for both victims and the voluntary sector, given that agencies 
within this sector are major providers of support for those affected by crime.  Before 
2014 the approach to the funding of victim services was not particularly of concern, 
save for questions being asked in the ‘audit culture’ of the early 2000s, around the 
extent to which the government funded agency Victim Support could be said to be 
providing ‘value for money’ (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
(2003); Mawby 2016).  However these concerns gained momentum with the 
incoming Coalition government of 2010, and by 2014 local commissioning had been 
introduced.  The previous mixed economy of service provision, via the largely 
centrally funded organisation ‘Victim Support’ as a ‘national victims service’, and an 
array of smaller and more financially independent victim agencies who had to bid for 
pots of funding much more competitively, gave way to a free market for all 
(Simmonds 2016)i.  In order to explore the implications of this, representatives from 
a group of voluntary sector agencies in the far southwest of England were 
interviewed in order to see what their experiences, so far, have been. 
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Background 
In 2014 the provision of victim services within England and Wales experienced a 
seismic shift, away from the longstanding combination of service provision that had 
developed over the past forty years.  That model of provision had comprised of a 
voluntary sector in which the largely centrally funded national agency Victim Support, 
and a range of smaller organisations whose funding was not necessarily so stable, 
were located (Simmonds 2016; Williams, 2016).  Victim Support provided a 
framework of local services to victims of a range of crimes throughout England and 
Wales, and as such took the form of a generic service.  Other voluntary agencies 
tended to offer more specialist services to victims of crimes such as rape and sexual 
assault and domestic abuse, as well as even more specific services working on 
behalf of victims in response to particular high profile cases, for example the Suzy 
Lamplugh Trust (see https://www.suzylamplugh.org/ ) and the Zito Trust (see 
http://www.zitotrust.co.uk/ ). 
 
As has been discussed elsewhere Victim Support developed in the 1970s in order to 
fill the gap that existed between offenders and victims, as prior to this there had been 
little or no specific provision made for victims of crime as actors within the criminal 
justice system (Mawby and Walklate 1994; Mawby 2016).  Effectively victims had 
long been regarded as the ‘Cinderella’ of the criminal justice system, and so Victim 
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Support was developed to create a more level playing field for them (Mawby and 
Walklate 1994).  Victim Support had therefore enjoyed a long history wherein its core 
funding was provided via direct grant from central government.  Indeed by 2008 the 
agency had been shaped by the then New Labour government into a national 
victims’ service (Victim Support 2012).  As such the central office in London (the 
National Association of Victim Support Schemes) was at the heart of a highly 
developed network of local schemes across England and Walesii.  The national office 
in London acted as a regulatory body, setting standards of service for the network of 
local schemes, and re-distributing grant aid from the Ministry of Justice to those local 
schemes.  As I and others have discussed, Victim Support provides emotional and 
practical help to victims of a range of crimes, and so for many years enjoyed the total 
confidence of government and state agencies such as the police (Simmonds 2013; 
2016; Mawby 2016).  This was due in part, no doubt, to the increasing 
professionalisation which the agency had developed over a long period of time 
(Maguire and Kynch (2000); Simmonds 2005, 2009, 2013).     
Victim Support had been financed by central government as the ‘go to’ service, to 
which the police referred victims.  By way of confirming the high level of esteem that 
the government held Victim Support in, the first Victims’ Charter in 1990 was the only 
agency mentioned to whom the police could refer victims.  Whilst the subsequent 
Victims Charter of 1996, and later Codes of Practice for Victims in 2006, 2013 and 
2015, have since widened the referral offer that can be made, Victim Support 
continued to be the only generic victims’ agency, and the only agency which had 
attracted core funding from central government.  In this way it had remained at the 
top of the table so to speak. 
In 2014 the government, in responding to Directive 2012/29/EU calling for greater 
clarity around the accessibility of victim services, introduced the local commissioning 
of victim services (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2016), as 
reflected in the latest Code of Practice for Victims in 2015 (Ministry of Justice, 2015).  
This meant that the responsibility for providing services would now be shared by the 
Ministry of Justice and local Police and Crime Commissioners throughout England 
and Wales (Wedlock and Tapley 2016).  Mawby (2016) adds that this move was also 
a direct policy change by the UK government, so that service provision: 
‘… would largely, be localised; funding would be by competitive tendering; 
and service outcomes would be rigorously assessed.’   (Mawby 2016: 11) 
Essentially the main message coming from the UK government was that victim 
services were to be localised with funding being awarded in response to competitive 
bidding, tying in neatly with the increasing neo-liberalism which has been in 
ascendency since the late 1970s, both in the UK and elsewhere (Gamble, 2001; 
Harvey, 2005), and so working to undermine centrally provided welfare solutions 
(Madoc-Jones et al., 2015).  This move also drew upon the rhetoric of austerity that 
has been well played out in the UK since 2010 (Callanan et al., 2012a; O’Hara, 
2015). 
Within each police authority, Local Police and Crime Commissioners have been 
required to take responsibility for victim services, and to enable victims’ easy access 
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to service providers.  In the area under scrutiny a Victim Care Unit is now in place, 
as is an online Victim Care Unit Directory, so that victims who report crime to the 
police (or not) can be referred or refer themselves to support agencies from that 
Directory.  Victims referred to the Victim Care Unit, after reporting crime, will be 
assisted to identify the agency/agencies to which they may then be referred.  
Searches can be entered into the Victim Care Unit Directory using three categories; 
‘type of crime’, ‘I want help with’ and ‘I want help from’.  Interestingly the Directory 
contains the details of many providers, some of whom whose work is specifically 
targeted towards victims of crime, but others whose services are not primarily victim 
orientediii.   
So, prior to the move to local commissioning, victims who reported crime to the 
police would be referred to victim support providers based on the type of crime 
experienced.  Those ending up at Victim Support’s door would be offered emotional 
and practical support, but could be signposted on to other agencies, depending upon 
their need for more specialist/longer term helpiv.  It is probably fair to say that Victim 
Support had then built up a huge knowledge base of support agencies working within 
the same localities, to whom they could refer victims on to. 
A number of issues have been raised in and around the shift to local commissioning 
of victims’ services, which have been discussed at length elsewhere (Simmonds, 
2016).  An initial issue is that of the political nature of the PCC role.  When in 2012 
the Ministry of Justice first mooted, and then swiftly confirmed, that local Police and 
Crime Commissioners were to be given responsibility for commissioning victim 
services in their localities, the fact that the PCC was democratically elected attracted 
challenge from practitioners and academics alike.  Davis (2014) reported that 50% of 
candidates in the PCC elections in 2012 identified as Conservative, and so 
speculated on the way in which such commissioners may undertake their role 
viewing victims more narrowly/conventionallyv.  For example such approaches may 
see economic principles being placed ahead of models of good practice, such as 
gendered service provision for victims of domestic/sexual violence and abuse.  Such 
monetarily directed approaches have attracted criticism (Robinson and Rowlands, 
2006; Hester et al., 2012).  Other commentators predicted that the appointment of 
individuals with political affiliations could be questioned, in terms of the power that 
such affiliations may hold for influencing the electorate (Duggan and Heap, 2014). 
In terms of funding, voluntary sector agencies have little by way of independent 
means, and so have no choice other than to engage with commissioners (Benson 
and Hedge, 2009), giving way to what has been called the ‘magnetic pull’ of public 
funding (Corcoran, 2009).  Bath (2011) saw this as evidence of voluntary sector 
organisations becoming ‘instruments of the state’, inasmuch as in the example of 
victim services, agencies carry out work that potentially the state itself could 
undertake.  In keeping with these lines of argument, the work of Davies (2014) is 
relevant, and the words of a Conservative PCC from that research illustrate this: 
‘Actually I could say, well you’re not all having the money unless you go for a 
joint bid and start to work together.’ 
        (Conservative PCC 1) 
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Mawby and Smith (2013) discussed the lack of representation by elected PCCs of 
their communities, in terms of gender and ethnicity, a trend that has been repeated 
in the 2016 election (Joyce, 2017).  Davis (2014) noted also how the potential for the 
principle of accountability, which was fundamental to the new role (May 2010), was 
already at stake inasmuch as many of the PCCs elected in 2012 had decided not to 
stand for re-election in 2016vi.  This, one may argue, has the potential to destabilise 
the environment in which victim services are operating, where the extent to which 
agencies can rely on funding streams continuing may be a constant concern 
(Williams 2016). 
Low turnouts for PCC elections have also been a trend, albeit the 2016 turnout was 
better (27.3% in 2016 versus 15.1% in 2012) (Electoral Commission 2016).  Gilling 
has also added to this discussion, noting how government adopted ‘putative 
technology’ in employing ‘electoralism’ to bring about democratic localism (2014: 95).  
And so again the lack of turnout challenges the extent to which PCCs are true 
reflections of their communities as a whole, and of all victims.  This and the political 
nature of the role of the PCC is also said to question the extent to which they will 
fund services for victims who may be less visible and/or less appealing to ‘their’ 
electorate (and to their political views).  Liberty (2012) expressed ‘grave concerns’ at 
the prospect of competitive tendering at the local level to a political head such as the 
PCC.  They saw the danger of funding going to services that gain more support from 
the electorate, such as more ‘visible’ and/or ‘deserving’ victims, and responded in 
this manner to the Ministry of Justice initial consultation document in the same year.  
Liberty were not alone in responding negatively to the idea of the PCC holding the 
purse strings for victim services, with 136 out of 196 agencies challenging the idea 
(Ministry of Justice 2012b; Mawby, 2016). 
The writing of funding bids and the increasingly competitive nature of attracting 
funding, were further issues that the shift to local commissioning raised.  Of course, 
voluntary sector agencies have a long established history of bidding for contracts, 
but the intensity of competition within neo-liberalism, made even more visible by the 
shift to local commissioning as a ‘competitive endeavour’ (Ministry of Justice 2012a; 
2012b) has the potential to ‘up the ante’ even more in this respect.  It is perhaps true 
to say that the move to local commissioning has brought the notion of competition 
‘closer to home’, as small agencies are competing against each other more often to 
the same local body - the PCC.   
Morgan (2012) and Clayton et al., (2012) noted how smaller voluntary sector 
agencies are potentially competing for more complex contracts which they do not 
always have the infrastructure to support.  Hirst and Rinne went on to talk about the 
heavier burden that submitting such bids places on smaller agencies, where for 
example they may not have the necessary bid-writing skills easily to hand.  In effect 
this means that smaller agencies will spend: 
 ‘…far more of their time on collating and checking, and monitoring 
performance information for their funders…’ 
            (Hirst and Rinne, 2012: 40) 
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Smaller agencies may then become even more reliant upon volunteer labour and 
subject to the risks that this can produce.  A further issue is the risk that the voluntary 
sector itself will be swallowed up by bigger commercial providers who have 
professional bid-writing teams (Hirst and Rinne, 2012).  This has occurred under the 
Transforming Rehabilitation agenda where offender management has been opened 
up to competition at the local level, and smaller agencies face much greater risks in 
competing against larger companies (Gelsthorpe and Hedderman, 2012; Mythen et 
al., 2012).   
The evaluation of services by ‘outcomes’ versus ‘outputs’ has been a further issue 
that the move to commissioning by the PCC has raised, as this was a central tenet of 
‘The Victims’ Services Commissioning Framework’ (Ministry of Justice 2013).  This 
identified outcomes as: 
‘…the changes, benefits, learning or other effects that happen as a result of 
services and activities provided by an organisation which result in sustainable 
change in user behaviour, condition and/or satisfaction. 
          (Ministry of Justice 2013: 21) 
A number of questions arise from this, which ‘The Victims’ Services Commissioning 
Framework’, amongst others, considered (Ministry of Justice, 2013).  Flint, in his 
work, stated that creating and collecting data on outcome measures is not 
necessarily straightforward (2010).  For example, when is the right time to collect 
data, particularly ‘distance travelled’ data, so that victims are treated with respect 
and dignity?  It was also envisaged that some agencies would have specialist staff 
who could create such measuring tools, whereas others would have to rely upon 
frontline staff undertaking this.  In this way an earlier report advised that staff training 
would be required (Callanen et al., 2012b).   
Some outcomes may take a long time to measure, for example a victim returning to 
work, which could occur after support has ceased.  The use of hard ‘binary’ 
measures has also been critiqued, for example the use of ‘re-offending’ as a 
yardstick for ‘success’ for women offenders is often too simplistic (Plechowicz, 
2015).  One may argue that the use of ‘simple’ binary measures for measuring the 
success of victim services is equally problematic; for example whether or not a victim 
has been re-victimised within a certain period, or whether they have reported the 
crime to the police (Simmonds, 2016).  Specialist victim services support smaller 
numbers of victims whose needs are greater and more complex.  Such services will 
potentially face difficulties in devising appropriate measures that are well thought out, 
and so avoid negative impacts upon a service, and upon their success of securing 
funding (Callenan et al., 2012b). 
One of the principles on which the local commissioning of victim services rests is that 
of ‘partnership’ and ‘multi-agency’ working (Ministry of Justice, 2013).  Whilst this 
principle has a long history for the criminal justice system and agencies working 
within or related to it (Crawford and Evans, 2017), the notion of functioning in this 
way, whilst at the same time being ‘in competition’, is not necessarily realistic 
(Madoc-Jones et al., 2015).  A review of partnership and multi-agency working 
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around children’s services identified the uncertainty and vulnerability of funding as a 
major obstacle to partnership and multi-agency working, stating that the concern 
which dominated such working was money ‘…getting it, keeping it and spending it…’ 
(Santos et al., 2004: 36).  The review noted that the focus upon finances was 
magnified by a real sense of the fragility of, and the short-termism in funding, as well 
as the impact that the competition for scarce resources was exerting on agencies.  
This impact was a threat to ‘community cohesion’, in other words the idea that 
agencies could ‘work together’.  Williams (2016), likewise, has also commented on 
how voluntary sector victim agencies have seen a shift over the last 30 – 40 years 
from charitable organisations as sources of funding, to the much greater reliance on 
state related bodies, to whom they must now bid competitively.  Clearly the move to 
commissioning at the local level via the Police and Crime Commissioner, as noted 
earlier, has the potential to add to this sense of competition, and within it, 
protectionism.        
         
Methodology 
The research for this paper was undertaken via qualitative interviews with 
representatives from nine local voluntary sector agencies located within the far 
southwest of England at a time when the first term of office for PCCs was coming to 
an end.  PCCs had been in situ since 2012, albeit the commissioning of services 
commenced in 2014 (Gov.UK 2013).  By the time of the interviews, agencies had 
therefore had around one year’s experience of local commissioning via the PCC.   
The agencies taking part largely supported victims of sexual and domestic abuse, 
however one agency, a local branch of the national organisation Victim Support, 
supports victims across a range of crimes.  Two of the agencies taking part were 
local Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCs), and so in this sense differed from 
the more ‘independent’ rape crisis organisations.  One agency worked only with 
children and young people who have experienced sexual/domestic abuse.   
It is important to note the nature of the agencies involved in this research, particularly 
given their respective histories in terms of access to funding both before and after 
the shift to local commissioning via the PCC.  A number of agencies providing 
services to victims of rape and sexual assault are what may be termed grass roots 
feminist inspired agencies, whose history of accessing funding has been turbulent 
(Mawby and Walklate 1994; Williams 2016).  Such agencies have not necessarily 
enjoyed the same relationship with the state and its agents, as for example Victim 
Support, and this in the past played out in terms of their ability to grow and obtain 
enough and consistent funding.   
Other agencies such as the SARCs, have a different relationship potentially with the 
state and its agents (Robinson and Hudson, 2011), given that they were introduced 
as a government initiative in 1986, and funding has therefore come from a number of 
sources including statutory agencies such as the NHS and the Police (Lovett et al., 
2004).  SARCs are in effect a one stop shop wherein a range of services are offered 
by both statutory and voluntary sector providers.  For example, the collection of 
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forensic evidence will be undertaken by a statutory service provider, whilst emotional 
support will be provided by the voluntary sector element of the service; in these ways 
providers work together under one roof, and so seek to reduce the level of trauma 
that rape and sexual assault victims face in reporting the crime and going through 
the court process (Robinson and Hudson, 2011).  This model, where different 
elements of service provision meet, is mirrored elsewhere within the sample.  For 
example one agency relies upon a social enterprise organisation to provide physical 
space for part of its work, whilst drawing upon ‘pots’ of money from different 
providers to fund the emotional and personal support work that staff and volunteers 
undertake.  In this way a ‘holistic’ domestic abuse service is provided.  Another 
sexual assault agency had benefited initially from Ministry of Justice funding via the 
Rape Support Grant, when it was set up originally, however such funding was time 
limited rather than providing ongoing guaranteed financial support.  This has 
therefore thrown the agency into the position of having to chase future funding, 
following the shift to local commissioning via the PCC. 
All of this means that within the sample, we have some agencies that have faced 
huge struggles over time in achieving initial and continued funding, whereas others 
have experienced greater levels of ease in their developmental journey, given either 
who they are connected to and/or the financial and ideological interest from 
government.  In order to recruit agencies to the sample, contact was made with a 
number of agencies known to the author, who had received funding from the PCC, 
and who were included in the Victim Care Unit Directory.  Within the interviewing 
process, further contacts were obtained and followed up.  This does mean that the 
sample is as such, a snowball sample (Brymon, 2016), however it is comprised of 
agencies whose histories in terms of funding and stability of service may be quite 
different.  This in effect makes the analysis and interpretation of the data gathered 
somewhat challenging. 
Findings and analysis 
The findings from the research are reported under four main headings: the politics of 
the PCC, the impact of outcome measures, issues relating to funding, competitive 
bidding and the commissioning process, and finally the extent to which the new 
system is working for agencies and, therefore for, victims alike.  
The politics of the PCC 
Whilst we asked initially about the political nature of the PCC, and the impact 
agencies felt this would have/was having, it became clear that the post-holder at the 
time was well-liked as an individual.  This, to some extent, challenges some of the 
views put forward in response to the government’s plan to devolve commissioning to 
PCCs, but shows also the uncertainty around who could have been elected (Ministry 
of Justice, 2012b): 
‘…brilliant …very thoughtful …who does genuinely care about victims of 
crime, particularly vulnerable victims…   I think we were quite anxious when 
the PCCs came – who would we get?  I know that up country they have got 
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some dreadful PCCs who have not given any money to the voluntary sector 
and who have not worked in partnership at all.’ 
                     (Agency 3) 
This uncertainty was repeated in terms of the elected nature of the post, tying in with 
predictions that a number of PCCs would not stand for re-election (Mawby and 
Smith, 2013)vii: 
‘… I do have all sorts of nervousness about X going, but nationally I don’t 
think the picture is altogether rosy.’ 
                       (Agency 4) 
‘I think the fact that it’s an elected position, the fact that the person can 
change so easily, and have a brand new vision, that’s a challenge, because it 
takes a long time to get any kind of service set up.’ 
                     (Agency 7) 
Agencies were concerned about the party political nature of the role of PCC, and the 
power that post-holders were to be given in undertaking commissioning, as 
documented in the paperwork setting out the plans for this (Ministry of Justice, 
2012a): 
  ‘…I mean they can do what they want, they are powerful people…’ 
                                     (Agency 3) 
Others considered the political nature of the role and the impacts this may have for 
agencies who traditionally been viewed as more radical: 
‘Some people say there are issues if your face doesn’t fit.  … Women’s Aid for 
example are feminist based, most domestic abuse services were set up on 
this basis but we are now in a diverse culture and commissioners have to 
commission in that way.  … if you got an organisation like Women’s Aid who 
have been doing it for 40/50 years, to get them to bend as well is actually 
quite difficult …’ 
          (Agency 2: Domestic Abuse) 
Respondents identified the ‘problem’ for some agencies in adhering to the more ‘old 
school’ feminist philosophies around single (female) gender services (Mawby and 
Walklate, 1994).  Unsurprisingly the agency commenting above was one that had 
taken up the baton of gender neutral services as part of its menu of provision.   
Another respondent spoke of the drive for ‘gender neutral’ sexual abuse support, and 
their fears for their feminist inspired service, again with the next election in mind: 
‘…it does really worry me …but it is difficult and I think the nature of the work 
we do, I don’t think necessarily when people are going to be putting 
themselves forward for the next PCC that our issues are going to be 
anywhere near the top of their agenda … at the moment there is this massive 
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gender neutralisation thing going around violence against women and girls 
and so much so we don’t even talk about violence against women and girls in 
(name of county), we talk about domestic violence and sexual violence …  We 
could well be marginalised.’              
                          (Agency 4) 
The respondent saying this was drawing upon experiences of bidding to other public 
sector funding bodies, where an increasing move towards gender neutral services 
was observed: 
‘…we lost our IDVA service, it was put out to tender.  It was written in a way 
that as a woman only organisation we couldn’t deliver what was asked in 
there.  We had always delivered in partnership with another organisation that 
had done all the men’s work.  … we had delivered that very successfully.   … 
We lost that bid to an organisation …never done any domestic violence work 
…so our team was axed in half…  So all our feminist empowerment model 
has just gone out of that work and it has been gender neutralised.’ 
                (Agency 4) 
This agency had lost funding for a service that they had developed and grown, and 
so the experience evidences the concerns expressed by Hirst and Rinne (2012), 
who saw the danger of victim services being re-shaped or ‘watered down’, in order to 
ensure success in the bidding process.  Liberty (2012) had also spoken of agencies 
being more likely to be funded where they are supporting victims who are more 
appealing to the PCC/electorate, and so again for the respondent in question, 
‘gender specific’ service provision seems to be at greater risk where politics abound.  
The agency further contended that the successful bidder had undercut them, 
showing economic imperatives gaining ascendency (Davies, 2014) over the ‘best 
practice’ of gendered services for victims of domestic abuse, which Robinson and 
Rowlands (2006) discuss.  The same agency went on to raise the issue of low 
turnout, playing further into the idea that the PCC is not representative of all victims, 
and the minority who vote may not be supportive of those deemed as ‘less 
deserving’ (Christie, 1986; Liberty, 2012; Mawby and Smith 2013).  
‘… it concerns me that any post is political and someone can be voted in by a 
very small percentage of the community.’ 
                       (Agency 4) 
Evaluating victim services: outcomes vs outputs 
The move to using outcome versus output measures, such as the impact that a 
service would have on a victim, rather than simply counting the number of offers of 
support being made/accepted, was a major feature of the move to local 
commissioning.  In effect this seems to have been aimed particularly at Victim 
Support, given that the Ministry of Justice report in 2012 focused upon shifting away 
from the central funding of victim agencies operating at the local level, and named in 
particular Victim Support as the agency fitting this description (2012a).  Within that 
report, and in earlier governmental papers Victim Support had been identified as not 
providing sufficient evidence that they were providing value for money (Public 
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Accounts Committee 2003; Ministry of Justice 2012a).  Interestingly other agencies 
within the research took the same view: 
 
‘…the reason they took all of their 800 grand away two years ago was 
because Victim Support were keeping poor data and nobody knew what they 
were doing, they were seeing very few people.’ 
                  (Agency 3) 
Of further interest was that the agencies in this research were not overly daunted by 
demands for outcome measures, and most if not all had been using this approach 
when evaluating their services.  Victim Support acknowledged that they had 
themselves adopted a ‘distance travelled’ approach to evaluating their service, as 
advised by the Victims’ Services Commissioning Framework Report (Ministry of 
Justice, 2013).  Indeed early adoption of this may have been part of their success in 
obtaining funding through the PCC, when other local branches of the service had not 
been successful (Mawby, 2016): 
‘… there is more of a demand … to look at outcomes …  So that’s what we 
have done to try and fit into that new world.’ 
                (Agency 7) 
Other agencies spoke positively about measuring outcomes, but noted the onerous 
nature of the increasing demands for services to ‘prove’ success.  Whilst they were 
talking about this in response to questions asked about the local commissioning of 
victim services by the PCC, it became clear that the issue of evaluating services via 
‘outcomes’ is something that other funders require also, and so this is not new to the 
group of respondents in the current research.  Frustration was voiced where the 
PCC’s requirements for outcome measures are viewed as a further burden in an 
already over-burdened world of data collection and monitoring: 
   
‘Well we could be delivering more service to more people if we didn’t have to 
tie up people with writing data and analysing data for six different (funding 
bodies’) needs’. 
                 (Agency 3) 
The following agencies spoke of the resource burdens of not having expertise to 
hand for submitting multiple returns to funders, resulting in real costs to the agency: 
‘…we are employing an in-putter and an analyst to really pull out all the 
reports that we need because we haven’t got the skills within the organisation, 
so we are having to invest money that nobody is paying us/giving us, it’s not 
included in any bid yet.’ 
                  (Agency 4) 
 ‘…the problem with all of them is that they are all asking for the same 
information but in a different way and it’s only going to get worse because if 
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we do get some funding in from other services, they are going to want again a 
different set of criteria for their data – it’s a nightmare.’ 
                   (Agency 6)  
The impact of staff time being used to collect data is therefore problematic for small 
local agencies, as has been discussed elsewhere around the demands upon 
agencies bidding for contracts for offender management services (Morgan, 2012; 
Gelsthorpe and Hedderman, 2012; Mythen et al., 2012).  Plus as Agency 4 
indicated, it’s all very well for the government to expect the high quality and quantity 
of evaluation data, and to advise that agencies may have to employ expert help 
(Callanan et al., 2012b), but there are real impacts for service provision coming from 
this.   
Finally one agency raised the issue that funders’ expectations for agencies being 
able to produce reliable data may be unrealistic, given the complex lives that people 
who have been victims of for example domestic/sexual abuse often live.  They said 
that clients would fill in a form at the start, but would not always complete further 
‘distance travelled’ evaluations: 
‘Every couple of months we send out another form in a stamped addressed 
envelope … I reckon we get 25% back, so it’s always hard to measure 
outcomes’. 
                (Agency 9) 
This chimes with the literature around measuring success of offender management 
services, where many offenders live unstable lives that are not necessarily in tune 
with the sterile world of ‘measurement’ (Plechowicz, 2015), as well as Flint’s 
research on evaluating services for families with diverse needs (2010).   
 
Funding, competitive bidding and the commissioning process 
Funding 
We asked agencies about their funding streams prior to the PCC commissioning 
being developed, and note how they were, and in the main still are, reliant upon a 
mix of organisations such as various levels of public sector funding (Ministry of 
Justice/Local Authority/NHS/Police) and charitable organisations (for example 
National Lottery, Comic Relief, Children in Need).  Voluntary sector agencies have 
long relied upon multiple sources of funding, which have allowed them to either 
flourish or founder along the way (Williams, 2016).  It became clear that funding was 
not able to be relied upon, both prior to and after the introduction of the local 
commissioning model, thus a sense of instability continues:   
 
‘…recent past … MoJ money...  You never know from year to year that you 
are going to get it…at some point prior to the PCC the MoJ fully funded our 
Court IDVA (Independent Domestic Violence Advisor) for example, now with 
that change suddenly the money was gone basically so then public health 
came in and said okay we have come up with half the money, but required the 
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service to come up with the other half … we have had to use our reserves to 
match funding for the last financial year.’ 
                         (Agency 5) 
 
‘The counselling, which came from the victim, witness and rape support 
money which was transferred over to PCC money the year before.  They 
(PCC) have supported us by providing money for the counselling service but 
not all of it, previously it was all funded and now it’s about 50% of it is funded, 
we are currently running the service with full funding for this 6 months but the 
previous 6 months we only had 50% funding for that service.  It sounds really 
complicated, and it is complicated.  From next year the 1st of April we’ve got 
no funding at all for counselling at the moment so we could have a whole 
service gone because the PCC won’t carry on funding it – although they are 
very supportive.’ 
                 (Agency 6) 
 
For both of these agencies, the funding that would come from the PCC did not cover 
the whole of their services, and may not be guaranteed from year to year, and so 
was limited in their view.  They also felt let down as the reality of PCC funding 
became real.  The Ministry of Justice had stepped back leaving the PCC with a big 
gap to fill.   
A further issue raised was the ‘short termism’ of funding, wherein agencies cannot 
plan, and are uncertain of future funding levels: 
‘…I don’t think I’ve experienced anything through the PCC that’s been a 
substantial improvement of services … so by having that money it had kind of 
helped us in the last year you know and help get this programme off the 
ground, but in terms of anything substantial no … we don’t even know what 
we are getting this year, we are getting less…’ 
               (Agency 5) 
Such uncertainties and gaps around funding tie in with the evidence presented by a 
range of authors who talk about the instability of funding facing voluntary sector 
agencies (Santos et al., 2004; Williams 2016).   
One agency, Victim Support, was previously largely funded by direct grant from the 
Ministry of Justice, and year on year this had been a guaranteed source of income.  
Now of course, Victim Support have to bid competitively at the local level for funding 
for their generic service for victims who may have experienced any crime, from the 
more minor to those that are more serious.  Whilst, as noted earlier, the Victim 
Support service in the current research had been successful in securing funding from 
the PCC, not all local Victim Support services were commissioned, as Mawby (2016) 
noted:   
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‘… so yeah it’s a brave new world …over the last ten years there was an 
increase in requirements to provide evidence of what we were doing but I 
mean looking at it, it was mostly on trust.  …in some places we have done 
very well, in others there isn’t a Victim Support anymore.’ 
                            (Agency 7) 
The loss of a local branch of Victim Support has been a blow to the agency, as well 
as for the pool of victims of potentially lessor crimes, for whom alternative support 
may be less clearly available (Mawby 2016).  Indeed such gaps in provision is 
something that one could not have envisaged, given the huge efforts by government 
to ensure local coverage by Victim Support over the past forty years or so 
(Simmonds 2016). 
 
 
Competitive bidding 
Agencies were asked about the competitive nature of commissioning via the PCC, 
and whether they felt a heightened sense of competition following the shift to local 
commissioning.  Given that agencies in the main have often had to bid for funding, 
most acknowledged that they were used to ‘competition’, thus the introduction of the 
PCC did not fundamentally change the situation.  One agency said they were used 
to having to ‘fight for money’, given that they were one of the more ‘old school’ 
sexual abuse services, who were very protective of the feminist philosophy which still 
drives them today, also noting their reluctance to rely too heavily upon particular 
sources of funding. 
‘What I have always been determined to do is keep a mixed pot of funding 
and not be dependent on any one commissioner’ 
                (Agency 4) 
However whilst respondents overall were used to being in competition, it does not 
mean that people are necessarily comfortable with the situation, in particular the 
comments below note that funding is limited, which undermines for example the 
issue of multi-agency working (Santos et al., 2004): 
 ‘We’re all going for the same pots so that’s always difficult because on the 
one hand you are expected to work in partnership with other agencies, but 
the next minute you are fighting over the same pots of money.’ 
                  (Agency 9) 
Another agency raised the potential for large scale companies such as Virgin moving 
in, again as is occurring and is being critiqued in the literature around the 
Transforming Rehabilitation agenda (Radcliffe et al., 2013): 
‘…it concerns me that some of the tenders that I’ve seen go out in recent 
times generally have been really written for Virgin Care.’ 
                 (Agency 5) 
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‘…our worries will always be when things are commissioned because it’s the 
big boys that come and snaffle.’  
                 (Agency 8)  
 
Whilst these agencies are talking about the commissioning of services by funding 
bodies that include the PCC, rather than talking exclusively about commissioning by 
the PCC, the worries are nevertheless being expressed. 
The commissioning process   
There are also concerns being expressed about the commissioning process itself, 
and the level of scrutiny that services are being subject to.  There was a feeling that 
agencies may be being set up without having the necessary expertise, and 
submitting bids that fall short of what needs to be put in place.  In the example cited 
below, a service had been commissioned to run a programme in schools, however 
the person doing this had broken down in tears, thus undermining the quality of 
delivery:    
 ‘…there needs to be scrutiny, an accreditation process where people reach a 
threshold…just like Comic Relief, you don’t just get a grant for Comic Relief 
you go on their training for the day in London.  Children in Need as well, and 
they really put you through it and its good, and it makes you feel like you 
actually – we deserve that.’ 
                  (Agency 1)  
 
Is the new system working effectively? 
In the current research, the referral system for victims of crime was via the Victim 
Care Unit.  This is based at police headquarters, and the staff working in the unit 
have the Victims Care Unit Directory of services which they can search in order to 
make appropriate referrals.  We asked agencies how this model was working, given 
that this is quite a big shift from the previous arrangements, which rested upon the 
police and Victim Support as the main referral bodies.  Agencies’ responses were 
mixed with several feeling that the system wasn’t working, because the number of 
referrals had reduced since the introduction of this system: 
 ‘Does it work – not really. …where are all of these people going?’ 
               (Agency 1) 
This was a fairly common response, although in amongst this, some positive feelings 
were expressed.  For example, victims may need a service that would not 
necessarily be obvious in the first instance: 
‘I actually think that’s a really good idea because this idea of looking at the 
need of the client is like a crime happens to someone’s life and there are 
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other needs in there.’        
                          (Agency 7) 
The respondent went on to comment that in her view the VCU would progress from 
being simply a referral unit, to becoming a service provider for those with the least 
needs: 
 ‘…I think they would agree with me when I say initially the idea was very 
much put forward that they (VCU) weren’t going to be a service provider.  I 
think they are moving towards some degree of being a service provider 
themselves because they are meeting the needs of clients with the least 
needs.  They are making the initial contact and sometimes giving them a call 
back the next week to make sure they are okay.’ 
                 (Agency 7) 
Other respondents saw the benefit of being able to easily see what other agencies 
exist, for the purpose of multi-agency working.  This, as we know has been core to 
the local commissioning plan (Ministry of Justice, 2012a): 
‘We have been and always encourage multi-agency working here so the 
victims’ hub is an extension of that.  What it has done is to allow you to learn 
about other agencies that are out there which we may not have otherwise 
learned about.’ 
                  (Agency 8) 
A major issue highlighted was that the VCU was not always making referrals to the 
appropriate service provider.  An agency working with victims of domestic abuse 
talked about low risk victims being sent to them erroneously, when they are only 
funded to work with high and medium risk cases, whilst others noted that referrals 
were being made beyond the geographical remit of agencies.  They commented on 
the complex nature of the commissioning that has taken place, and the fact that the 
police and the VCU have to make sense of such complexity: 
‘I feel sorry for the VCU and the police to be honest with you, they have a 
really difficult job because of the way of the infrastructure of commissioning 
that is done in X.  …they (agencies) all have their own different protocols and 
the police have got to work out oh hang on we can’t do this in this area 
because they are not commissioned to do it.  …So some services provide 
everything and some are very limited in what they provide – but that’s the way 
we were commissioned.’ 
                 (Agency 2) 
‘…some of the referrals we’ve had to reject because they are in X and out of 
our area.  We don’t have an office there and travelling two and a half hours is 
probably too far to send a volunteer.’ 
                  (Agency 5) 
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The fear that Agency 5 expressed was that the VCU may get used to them 
‘knocking back’ referrals and that this may affect the referral rate to them further: 
‘…why keep referring to X if every time we are saying oh sorry it’s the wrong 
area, I am going to knock it back.’ 
                  (Agency 5) 
These experiences and fears chimed with the thoughts of agencies interviewed by 
Madoc-Jones et al., (2015) where respondents felt that the police in the area 
under exploration for their work, needed further training under the new 
arrangements.  Similarly in my work, respondents felt that the Victim Care Unit 
Staff and the police needed more training in order to refine current arrangements, 
so that victims will be sent to the correct place for assistance.  Essentially there 
are issues for the victim here, if they are directed to the wrong agency, this can 
delay them getting the support that they need, and so feel a sense of secondary 
victimisation (Davies et al., 2017) as well as dissatisfaction with the criminal 
justice system, which victim services are meant to improve (Bradford, 2011; 
Christie, 2010): 
‘I think there needs to be more awareness around what it is we can 
offer, VCU has got to have additional training, police have got to have 
additional training…’ 
                (Agency 6) 
 
Agencies reflected upon the fact that to a certain extent they were between ‘a rock 
and a hard place’ in that victims of sexual assault for example are far less likely to 
report the crime to the police (HM Government, 2010).  This was particularly so for 
complex cases, where for example the victim and the offender were well known to 
one another, or the case was historic (Robinson and Hudson, 2011). The perception 
held of the Victim Care Unit’s closer connection with the police, was then of concern 
for agencies whose clientele may be put off by this:      
 ‘…85% of victims of sexual violence never go near the police, and it’s (VCU) 
a police website.  It’s a police unit, with police personnel on the phone, so we 
are glad to be part of it because some people do want our service and might 
be thinking of reporting… but most of our referrals are never going to come 
through them.  …women are scared for all kinds of reasons to go down that 
route.’ 
                  (Agency 3) 
‘…you only have to mention the word police to our client group, … there’s so 
much stigma attached to the police…  The police are inextricably attached to 
the system (VCU) … our clients would be really frightened of that.’ 
                  (Agency 9) 
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This escalated further into worries that low referral rates through the VCU may result 
in funding cuts, particularly if payment by results were to be introduced, as in the 
example of offender management services (Annison et al., 2014): 
‘…I think the personalities in place at the moment in the PCC’s office 
understand that.  But you could get someone new come in and say why are 
we giving them twenty grand a year when they are only seeing ten people?  
But we’re not, we are seeing hundreds of people, but just not hundreds that 
went through that route, as that is the statutory police route.’ 
                   (Agency 3) 
For this particular agency (Agency 3), 50% of referrals are self-referrals, with only 
6% of referrals from the police in 2014/2015.  Other referrals come from GP and 
mental health services, but ‘50% won’t go near these agencies, they are not going to 
disclose to just anyone’.  Victims of very complex sexual abuse are, as research 
shows, more likely to seek help from an independent Rape Crisis agency (Robinson 
and Hudson, 2011). 
A final theme that emerged was that Victim Support’s monopoly had been broken, 
such that other agencies were ‘more visible’.  These comments clearly tapped into 
perspectives around how the agency had developed, prior to the introduction of local 
commissioning through the PCC; both in terms of funding and related to this the 
widening of their client base: 
 ‘…Victim Support wanted to own very victim and wanted to be a specialist in 
everything, they saw themselves as domestic abuse specialists and sexual 
violence specialists … we monitored it for years and that was one of the 
things that was fed back of course into the PCC.  That we never got referrals 
(from Victim Support) so at least now we are seen as a specialist agency by 
the VCU and we get referrals.’ 
                (Agency 4) 
‘…it is political around here, you talk to any of the Chief Execs of any of any of 
the agencies, the level and type of referrals coming out of Victim Support 
suggests that victims are not getting the specialist service that they need.  
Victim Support is a general service which is great, but they will have lots of 
people phoning about domestic and sexual violence, and they are not sending 
them to the correct facilities.’ 
                  (Agency 3) 
This clearly feeds into what appear to be mixed messages around the notion of local 
commissioning via the PCC, such that some respondents feel that a ‘wrong’ is being 
‘righted’ so that if victims do report to the police, they feel there is a greater chance 
of the referral being made to them.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
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The aim of this paper has been to explore how voluntary sector victim agencies in 
England and Wales have been affected by a new form of local commissioning, 
undertaken by those elected to the relatively new role of Police and Crime 
Commissioner.  As acknowledged earlier, many voluntary sector agencies have long 
been accustomed to bidding for funding, given that this has been the way in which 
the voluntary sector has developed over time (Williams, 2016).  For these agencies 
the introduction of local commissioning is then, to some extent, ‘business as usual’.  
However for one particular agency, Victim Support, this shift means that for the first 
time in many years, its local schemes face competition for access to funding.  
Notwithstanding these differences, it is clear from the research that the issues 
reported in this paper are very relevant to the agencies in the current sample.   The 
four main issues that came out of the research were as follows: the political nature of 
the Police and Crime Commissioner, the focus by the PCC on outcome measures, 
funding and related issues, and finally, the extent to which the new system was 
working for agencies and victims alike. 
The political nature of the PCC is an issue for victim agencies, given the 
uncertainties that this has raised.  These uncertainties were around ‘who’ they would 
get as the PCC, and whether incoming post-holders would bring with them politics 
with a larger ‘P’, such that agencies representing victims whose ‘faces didn’t fit’ 
would potentially face marginalisation.  In reporting their concerns around politics 
entering the commissioning process, agencies told of their wider (negative) 
experiences when submitting bids for funding at county level for example, and some 
of the entrenched views that abounded there, as well as commenting on those 
relating to the PCC. 
In talking about the PCC’s focus upon outcome measures, this did not cause 
particular concern for agencies, who all reported that they had been using such 
measures rather than mere outputs.  However digging under the surface of this, 
agencies were feeling the pressure of collecting data that was more complex, and for 
multiple funders.  These pressures for small agencies were around the diversion of 
scarce resources away from frontline work.  It therefore became clear that whilst the 
introduction of local commissioning via the PCC had not been the initial cause of 
such burdens, it was in effect perpetuating the load, and the frustrations that 
agencies expressed.    
In asking about funding it became clear that agencies felt that they were vulnerable, 
and that for some the introduction of local commissioning via the PCC was not 
necessarily improving things, particularly given that as the PCC took over, the state, 
often in the guise of the Ministry of Justice, stepped back to leave gaps in funding 
that were not always filled.  This was evidence of the same fragility that Santos et al. 
(2004) refer to in their work, and Meek and Mills (2012) in discussing voluntary 
sector offender management agencies, whose experiences are sharpened by the 
use of payment by results funding.  Agencies spoke of the short-termism of funding, 
both from wider funding bodies as well as the PCC.   
Agencies were largely well accustomed to having to be in competition, however the 
interviews showed that respondents were not necessarily comfortable with that, 
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noting the irony at being expected to enter into multi-agency working, particularly 
when they ‘were all going for the same pots’.  These comments mirror those of 
Santos et al. (2004).  Others saw the danger that larger companies would move in, 
just as is occurring within the Transforming Rehabilitation Agenda (Radcliffe et al., 
2013).  Others felt that commissioning processes need to be robust, so that agencies 
come under full scrutiny in their funding bids, so as to ensure that good practice will 
be adhered to (Clayton et al., 2012; Morgan, 2012).   
An issue that is specific to the sample on which is paper is based is whether the new 
commissioning system is working for agencies and victims.viii  As noted earlier, the 
system in place provides that Victim Care Unit staff support victims to access 
services that are listed on an online Directory of Services.  A very strong theme from 
the research was that referrals had reduced since the PCC became involved directly 
in victim services.  For some agencies this raised worries on two counts: firstly for 
victims, in terms of which agencies they were being referred to, and whether their 
needs were being met.  A second concern was that of funding, where agencies 
feared the PCC reducing this on the basis of numbers of referrals, given the growing 
move in other sectors to payment by results.  Underpinning this further was the 
knowledge for some agencies of their service users, such that victims of sexual 
abuse are generally reluctant to report crimes to the police.  This would then feed 
into fewer referrals from the Victim Care Unit.  Whilst agencies felt that Victim Care 
Unit staff were aware of this crime-specific under-reporting, they were not convinced 
that this understanding would rise above number crunching judgements as to their 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy. 
Overall the move to commissioning via the PCC, has represented the reinforcement 
of competition amongst victim support services at the local level, and therein a 
reinforcement of neo-liberalism at the local level (Mawby, 2016; Simmonds, 2016).  
Without doubt the fears that commissioning in its widest form, as well as via the 
PCC, is a political endeavour have been evidenced by the respondents’ own words.  
These words tie into the very nature of the neo-liberal world in which we live, where 
competition for resources is rife, and in the course of competing individuals are 
subject to the vulnerabilities and fragilities that have been discussed above. 
In order to do full justice to this topic, further research is needed to unpick the finer 
workings of local commissioning via the PCC.  This should be undertaken on a much 
wider scale and, given that we have now seen a second PCC election, at a point 
when the model is much more established.  This is a baton that is waiting to be 
picked up. 
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i Albeit a number of victim services continue to be funded centrally at a national level, where this is seen as 
warranted by the government, for victims of homicide, victims of trafficking and victims of terrorism; plus of 
course the national Witness Service (Mawby 2016). 
 
ii There were also separate Victim Support schemes for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Jersey. 
iii An example of this is one agency which offers equine therapy.  
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iv Whilst Victim Support was set up originally to provide emotional and practical support to victims of a range 
of crimes, and as such is a ‘generic’ service, the agency has more recently developed support for victims of 
more serious crimes such as domestic and sexual abuse. 
 
v This result was replicated in the 2016 elections (Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, 2017). 
 
vi Indeed this was the case for the PCC in the area under study for this paper. 
vii The PCC referred to here did not stand for re-election. 
 
viii A number of models exist for local commissioning across England and Wales (Wedlock and Tapley (2016), 
however it has been beyond the scope of this paper to address the models in place. 
 
